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DIFFERENT ACROSS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES? 
 
1. Introduction 
In April 2007, New Century Financial, the second largest US sub-prime lender targeting people 
with poor credit history, filed for bankruptcy. During the two years after that, many other major 
names of the financial world fell one after another, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, 
Lehman Brothers, HBOS, Bradford and Bingley, Northern Rock, RBS, Halifax, to name just a 
few. The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, also known as the credit crunch, has left behind 
enormous vestiges in the aftermath that we are still dealing with now.  
The financial crisis certainly did not just affect financial institutions. At heart of the problem, 
the crisis has seriously damaged the world’s financial system, which in turn affected the flow 
of capital around the globe. Firms, especially those which depend on external finance, 
therefore, also became the victims of the crisis (OECD, 2009, 2010). Campello et al. (2010) 
survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers around the world and report that 86% of the surveyed 
companies have to bypass attractive investment opportunities due to lack of sufficient external 
finance as a result of the financial crisis. The same study also reveals that firms have to plan 
deep cuts in spending, especially on high-tech research and development (R&D hereafter) and 
employment. What do the results of such survey tell us? The effect of the financial crisis is not 
just tough, it will persist. The reason is simple: if innovation activity is affected, it would 
weaken an important competitive edge of a country and that would have severe long-term 
consequences (Tidd and Bessant, 2009; Paunov, 2010).  
  
 
Therefore, it is no surprise that in the aftermath of the financial crisis many governments around 
the world concern with the questions: how much the financial crisis has affected the country’ 
innovation activities and how the policy responses should address such concern (Claessens et 
al., 2012). That creates an imperative demand for research that could build up our 
understanding of the effect of the crisis on innovation. In response to such demand, there is a 
growing body of the literature that looks at how innovation is affected by the crisis (e.g. Correa 
et al., 2010; Sidorkin and Srholec, 2010; Archibugi and Filippetti, 2011; Llach et al., 2011). 
Research in this area generally attracts great attention and is of significant contribution to both 
the academic literature and the world of practitioners and policy-makers.  
The paper focuses on the context of the European Union (the EU hereafter) and seeks to 
investigate (i) how the 2007-2009 global financial crisis has affected innovation activities of 
European countries, (ii) what the most and the least affected countries are, and (iii) what makes 
the impact of the financial crisis unequal across countries. The EU is a key player in the world 
economy and is among the most seriously affected areas. Therefore, insights about how the 
financial crisis has affected this part of the world are of significant importance. Due to such 
importance, the EU has naturally attracted a great deal of effort from researchers to investigate 
the impact of the financial crisis. To date, it has been documented that the financial crisis has 
significantly affected innovation activities in European countries and that the effect of the crisis 
on innovation is different across countries (Archibugi and Filippetti, 2010, 2011; Archibugi et 
al., 2012, 2013 etc.). This paper seeks to contribute to this literature by exploring the differences 
across various dimensions of the national systems of innovation of the most and the least 
affected European countries. 
Moreover, the investigation into the possible explanations for the unequal impact of the 
financial crisis on innovation across European countries is of significant value to policy-makers 
  
 
in the post-crisis era. Consistently throughout the history of the EU, one of the very bases of 
the existence of the EU is to establish and foster cohesion, convergence and integration among 
European countries. The financial crisis creates a chaotic environment in which those core 
objectives of the EU are challenged. Of particular relevance to the topic investigated in this 
paper is the convergence issue. What we have known is that there exists a big disparity between 
a small ‘elite’ group of EU countries, e.g. Germany, France, Finland..., and the group of weaker 
states, e.g. Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary... (Pavitt, 1998; Lorenz and Lundvall, 2006). The ‘elite’ 
group in general has better infrastructure, technical capability and also better financial ability 
(European Commission, 2009b), i.e. those factors which are essential to foster innovation. 
What the EU has been trying to do is to reduce that disparity to create a unified European 
system of innovation (rather than 27 small systems lie separately next to each other) in the hope 
to close the gap with its rivals, the US and Japan (Archibugi and Coco, 2005). If we look at 
that effort through the lens of the financial crisis, the vision of a unified European system of 
innovation seems less likely to realize since the crisis would affect the weaker countries, with 
worse scientific and technical infrastructure and greater dependence on outside capital, more 
severely (Archibugi and Filippetti, 2010, 2011; Archibugi et al., 2012, 2013 etc.). In other 
words, the financial crisis has been worsening the convergence process in the EU since the 
weak states are becoming weaker in a faster rate compared to the ‘elite’ countries. Back to the 
reason why the EU exists, this is an issue that must attract the EU’s utmost priority. And 
without an understanding of why the financial crisis would affect different EU countries 
unequally, policy-makers are not ready to tackle it. This paper contributes to such 
understanding and thus is a valuable contribution. 
Based on the European Commission’s (2009a) Innobarometer (hereafter the Innobarometer 
2009), it is firstly found that the financial crisis does significantly affect innovation activities 
of European countries, which confirms and reinforces the existing evidence (Correa et al. 2010; 
  
 
Archibugi and Filippetti, 2010; Campello et al., 2010; Archibugi and Filippetti, 2011; Llach et 
al., 2011; Archibugi et al., 2012, 2013 etc.). The paper then identifies the countries which are 
affected the most and the least by the financial crisis. Lithuania and Greece fall within the most 
affected group while Finland and Austria are the least affected. The main analysis of the paper 
is then conducted to compare and contrast various characteristics of the most and least affected 
countries along some important dimensions of the national system of innovation (NSI 
hereafter). Lithuania and Greece share several common characteristics of the NSI, which are 
in sharp contrast to the common characteristics shared by Austria and Finland. In particular, 
significant differences are found between the most and the least affected countries along the 
dimensions of culture, the quality of the higher education system, the science and technological 
capabilities as well as the structure of the economy. Those differences could to a large extent 
explain for the unequal impact of the financial crisis across countries.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the relevant literature is reviewed to 
identify the gap to which this paper aims at contributing to. With insights from the existing 
literature, section 2 ends with a list of research questions that this paper would seek the answers 
for. Section 3 and 4 present the analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on innovation 
activities of European countries and identify which countries are affected the most and the 
least. Section 5 compares and contrasts the main characteristics of the most and least affected 
countries. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Innovation in crisis times 
Despite being the subject of extensive research, there is not yet a generally accepted definition 
of innovation. However, most of the widely-used definitions have a common ingredient for 
innovation: ‘newness’ (Johannessen et al., 2001). With ‘newness’ at the core, different types 
of innovations could be defined by looking at two dimension of the ‘newness’: what is new 
  
 
and how new? The first dimension, i.e. the answer to the ‘what is new’ question, distinguishes 
between product, process, position and paradigm innovation, or the 4Ps. The ‘how new’ 
dimension then rates the innovation on a scale with radical and incremental at the two opposite 
extremes. Tidd and Bessant (2009, p19) define innovation as “the process of turning [new] 
ideas into reality and capturing value from them”. This definition implies innovation would 
create benefit for firms as well as the countries those firms operate in, and thus normatively it 
should be encouraged. At firm-level, Hauptly (2008) shows that on average innovative firms 
offer a superior stock return of 3% per year as compared with the non-innovators. It has also 
been shown that innovation is positively related to firm’s profitability and growth (e.g. Geroski 
and Machin, 1992; Kleinknecht and Mohnen, 2002; Innovaro, 2008). Furthermore, since the 
last century economic growth at country-level also depends heavily on innovation activities 
(Segerstrom, 1991; Baumol, 2002). However, as noted by Neely and Hii (1998), economic 
performance does not solely rely on innovation, but rather a wide range of other factors. 
Despite being important, there are many barriers to innovation. The existing literature has 
identified a rather long list of the key barriers, including those external to the firm such as poor 
infrastructure, deficient education system, discouraging legal system, inadequate financial 
resources to pursue long-term projects etc. and some internal barriers such as organizational 
procedures, communication structures, conservatism, lack of vision and motivation, 
unwillingness to change, risk-adverse managers (Howard, 1992; OECD, 1992; Wiig and 
Wood, 1997; Neely and Hii, 1998; Hadjimanolis, 1999; Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2009; D’Este 
et al., 2012 etc.).  
In general, the literature tends to be conclusive about the significant role of innovation for both 
firms and countries to thrive sustainably. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that most 
governments around the world pay a lot of attention to encouraging innovative activities in the 
  
 
economy (OECD, 2009, 2010). In order to have effective and appropriate policies to encourage 
innovations, it is important that the governments understand what create a good national system 
to support innovations. Such area of policy-making is informed by a body of the literature, 
namely research into the NSI. The concept of NSI is introduced way back to 1841 when 
Friedrich List, a German philosopher, published his book The National System of Political 
Economy. However, the seminal studies that frame the NSI concept for our nowadays modern 
economy are Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993). At heart of research into 
NSI is the quest for country-specific factors that drive innovations. So far, the literature has 
identified a handful of NSI factors which are important drivers of innovations. Pinto and Pereira 
(2012), for example, analyze 64 variables to try describing the NSI of 15 European countries. 
Archibugi and Michie (1997) cluster NSI factors down to some main dimensions, namely 
education and training, science and technological capabilities, industrial structure, science and 
technology strengths and weaknesses, interactions within the innovation system, absorption 
from abroad, and others which “are rooted in history, and concern the culture, size, language 
and vocation of a nation”.  
There is a large body of the literature examining the effect of economic crisis on innovation. 
This literature owes its origin to the classical Schumpeter’s (1939) business cycle. In particular, 
the Schumpeterians view innovation and economic performance as inter-correlated and they 
fluctuate depending on the other counterpart in a cyclical manner. The business cycle model 
specifies a theoretical equilibrium at which the economy is at a stationary state. Such 
equilibrium is reached when there is no innovative activity. As firms innovate, the economy 
would leave the equilibrium to develop. Things would keep going on like that until innovation 
activities reach the marginal limit when the economy starts to fall into the downward trend. 
Economic downturn would then be responsible for even less innovative activity, until the 
market becomes so uncompetitive that new firms, with more innovative capacity, are allowed 
  
 
to enter and compete the non-innovative firms away or the existing firms need to innovate more 
to survive. With more innovative activities, the economy would start to pick up again. This 
process whereby innovations increase during economic downturn is often referred to as the 
Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’, or the ‘counter-cyclical’ hypothesis, which for a long 
time has dominantly shaped the way we understand how economic crises would affect 
innovation. 
The Schumpeter’s business cycle model has passed the test of time to stand as one of the key 
building blocks in our modern business theories. Nevertheless, there are several subsequent 
contributions, both to supplement and to challenge the original theory, which make this issue 
an area of dispute. Mensch (1979) argues that only during economic downturns would more 
radical innovations be developed since the difficult economic climate might motivate the 
forerunners to breakthrough to survive. Mensch’s depression trigger hypothesis has received a 
lot of attention and could explain very well the 1970s recession episode. Soete (2009) shows 
that economic downturns often lead to less skilled labour being sacked to give space for 
keeping more qualified personnel, a process referred to as ‘labour hoarding’ which sparks 
innovative activities. There is also evidence that firms would easily switch resources to R&D 
during recession to reap future profits when the economy finally gets back to normal (Stiglitz, 
1993; Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998). It is because during recession the opportunity cost of 
increasing R&D spending (thus having to cut down real investment which could produce 
immediate profits) is lower than in a boom economy. On the other hand, however, other authors 
suggest a cyclical hypothesis, i.e. important innovations would appear mainly when the 
economic climate is conducive due to the very high uncertainty associated with seminal 
innovations (e.g. Clarke et al., 1981; Van Dujin, 1983; Shleiffer, 1986; Francois and Lloyd-
Ellis, 2003). Paunov (2010) presents empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
  
 
financial crises reduce innovations. Paunov (2010) argues that the increase in financing 
constraints is mainly responsible for the negative effect of the crisis on innovations. 
Currently with 27 member states, including some of the world largest economies, the EU is an 
important player in the world economy. In 2000, the Lisbon Agenda was devised with the aim 
to develop a sustainable knowledge-based economy in the EU with innovation as the central 
motor. With innovation at heart of the policy to foster long-term growth for the EU, it is no 
surprise that research into innovations in European countries has attracted a lot of attention 
from the academic community, especially during the last decade (e.g. Andreasen et al., 1995; 
Cantwell and Iammarino, 1998, 2003; Radosevic, 1999, 2004; Rodriguez-Pose, 1999, 2001; 
Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004; Archibugi and Lundvall, 2000; Borras, 2003; Griffith et al., 
2006; Van Vught, 2009, Krammer, 2009). 
Of particular relevance to this paper is the body of the literature that examines the effect of the 
financial crisis on innovations of European countries. Looking at aggregate data at EU-level, 
the European Union (2011) reports that R&D investment in the EU has dropped significantly 
during the 2008-2009 period. The report also alerts that some EU countries are affected more 
severely than the others in terms of having to cut down R&D budget. The OECD (2009, 2010) 
reached the same conclusion that R&D investment, especially in high risk long-term projects, 
has reduced markedly in 2008. Correa et al. (2010) and Llach et al. (2011) also provide 
empirical evidence of the reduction of innovation investment in Europe. Campello et al. (2010) 
conduct a survey of CFO, including those from firms in the EU, and report that firms have to 
cut investment in innovation remarkably as a result of the financial crisis. Archibugi and 
Filippetti (2011) find that the financial crisis has slowed down the convergence process in the 
EU resulting in a growing disparity in innovative capabilities among EU countries. Sidorkin 
and Srholec (2010) found that in the context of Eastern and Southern Europe the effect of the 
  
 
financial crisis is heavier for countries with less innovative firms. Archibugi et al. (2012) 
provide empirical evidence that the financial crisis has enabled some small and young firms to 
increase their innovative activities and thus becoming the new challengers to the traditional 
incumbent firms which are likely to struggle to invest more in innovation during the economic 
turmoil.  
Archibugi and Filippetti (2010) analyze the Innobarometer 2009 in conjunction with some 
macroeconomic data and find that the financial crisis has affected different European countries 
differently. In an attempt to explain such difference, they found that the quality of national 
human resources, the level of dependency on high-tech industries and the development of the 
financial systems are the key factors that mitigate the effects of the financial crisis on 
innovations at the national level. This paper builds up on Archibugi and Filippetti (2010) and 
investigates a larger range of possible explanations for the unequal impact of the financial crisis 
on innovations across European countries. The paper bases on the established literature on NSI 
to serve as a framework for the investigation. In particular, the research questions are: 
(i) Does the financial crisis affect European countries? 
(ii) If yes, which are the most and the least affected countries? 
(iii) What make the impact of the crisis different across European countries? In particular, 
do the following factors exaggerate or restrain the impact of the crisis on innovation: 
(iii.a) National characteristics 
(iii.b) Higher education system  
(iii.c) Science and technological capabilities 
(iii.d) Structure of the economy 
  
 
3. The impact of the global financial crisis on European countries 
Although the paper uses data from various sources, the Innobarometer 2009, the eight wave of 
survey on innovation conducted under the framework of the Flash Eurobarometer (European 
Commission, 2009a), feeds the very first and most important data for the paper. To examine if 
the financial crisis has affected European countries, the answers to two questions in the 
Innobarometer 2009 in each European country are analyzed in a fashion which is in principle 
similar to the main methodology used by Archibugi and Filippetti (2010). In particular, the 
answers for the following questions in the Innobarometer 2009 survey will be analyzed: 
Question 3: “Compared to 2006, has the amount spent by your firm on all innovation 
activities in 2008 increased, decreased, or stayed approximately the same (adjust for 
inflation)?” 
Question 4: “In the last six months has your company taken one of the following actions 
[increased, decreased or maintained the innovation spending] as a direct result of the 
economic downturn?” 
The Innobarometer 2009 survey was conducted from 1 to 9 April 2009. Hence, the ‘last six 
months’ used in question 4 would refer to the period from October 2008 up to the time when 
the survey was conducted, and the reference period in question 3 is, as also explained in the 
Innobarometer 2009, the preceding period going back to 2006. Such time frame matches well 
with the timeline of the financial crisis. Although the crisis spans over a long period of time, 
we could easily spot its climax is around July to September 2008, the months where Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, HBOS, AIG etc. falls unstoppably one after another, 
which in turn spreads panic around the world and pulls forward enormous measures from 
politicians, such as the proposal of huge bailout funds in the US and across the globe. 
  
 
Therefore, the six months period from October 2008 to April 2009 would capture any changes 
in firms’ innovation policies as a result of observing the worst part of the financial crisis.  
Question 4 of the Innobarometer 2009 survey is designed to capture the direct impact of the 
financial crisis while question 3 would provide a reference period immediately before the 
financial crisis. For each question, the Innobarometer 2009 asks the respondents to pick the 
most appropriate answer, namely (i) increased, (ii) decreased, (iii) stayed approximately the 
same, (iv) not applicable since the company has no innovation activity in the reference period 
or (v) cannot answer for any other reasons.  
Archibugi and Filippetti (2010) have analyzed the same dataset to investigate the impact of the 
financial crisis on European countries. In particular, for each question a measure of ‘innovation 
balance’ is constructed by subtracting the percentage of firms answering ‘increased’ from the 
corresponding ‘decreased’ percentage. Archibugi and Filippetti (2010) observe that during the 
2006-2008 period, innovation balance is positive in most European countries whereas during 
the six months since the crisis began, innovation balance is mostly negative. They concluded 
from such evidence that the financial crisis does affect innovation activities in European 
countries. 
In this paper, Archibugi and Filippetti’s (2010) analyses will first be replicated. The ‘innovation 
balance’, denoted INBAL, is constructed exactly the same way as in Archibugi and Filippetti 
(2010) and reported in Table 1. The first 13 columns just reproduce the raw data from the 
Innobarometer 2009 survey. Columns 14 and 15 are essentially a replication of Archibugi and 
Filippetti (2010). Column 16 calculates how much INBAL has dropped during the first six 
months of the financial crisis as compared to the 2006-2008 reference period. In Table 1, we 
order the data by INBAL during the crisis (column 13). As could be seen from the table, INBAL 
in the pre-crisis period (column 15) are all positive while the balance is mostly negative in the 
  
 
crisis (except only for Malta, Austria, Finland, and Sweden). The positive INBAL in the pre-
crisis period would imply that in the pre-crisis period more firms increase their innovation 
investment, and then when the financial crisis started, INBAL falls negative indicating more 
firms had to cut their budget for innovation. In summary, the evidence tends to suggest that the 
crisis has negatively affected innovation activities in Europe, which is in line with the 
established evidence (Correa et al. 2010; Archibugi and Filippetti, 2010; Campello et al., 2010; 
Archibugi and Filippetti, 2011; Llach et al., 2011; Archibugi et al., 2012 etc.). 
[Table 1] 
Archibugi and Filippetti’s (2010) approach could, however, only give a general impression 
rather than a more detail understanding of how the crisis actually impacted on innovation. 
Therefore, the paper takes a step further by looking deeper into the detailed answers to the 
aforementioned questions in the Innobarometer 2009 (i.e. ‘increased’, ‘decreased’, ‘stay the 
same’, no innovation’). To perform such analyses, the following steps are done: 
(i) The percentages reported in the Innobarometer 2009 are converted back into number of 
firms. 
(ii) The number of firms which provide a ‘Not applicable’ answer is excluded. 
(iii) The percentages for each type of answers (i.e. ‘increased’, ‘decreased’, ‘stay the same’, 
‘no innovation’) are then recalculated (but with the sum excluding ‘N/A’ firms). 
(iv) CI_IN, CI_DE, CI_SA and CI_NO (correspond with ‘increased’, ‘decreased’, ‘stay the 
same’, ‘no innovation’), four measures of the impact of the financial crisis on 
innovation, is created by subtracting the percentages of each type of answers in the six-
month period preceding the conduct of the Innobarometer 2009 (i.e. October 2008 to 
April 2009 as specified in question 4 of the Innobarometer 2009) by the corresponding 
  
 
percentages in the reference period (i.e. January 2006 to September 2008 as specified 
in question 3 of the Innobarometer 2009). 
By construct, if CI_IN is negative, and CI_DE, CI_SA, CI_NO are positive, it is evidence of 
the financial crisis negatively affect innovation. By looking at those measures rather than just 
INBAL, the paper can reveal more detailed evidence as to whether the crisis actually affect 
innovation through reducing the number of firms that would expand innovation investment, or 
increasing the number of firms that cannot increase the budget for innovation, or have to reduce 
it or even become non-innovative. Table 2 reports the results, which are sorted by CI_IN 
(column 10). As shown in column 2, in the six-month period immediately after the crisis there 
are still some firms which are ready to ‘swim upstream’ to increase rather than decrease 
innovation budget. However, such number has declined remarkably compared to the reference 
period. As a result, CI_IN are mostly negative across countries implying the number of 
innovators (i.e. those which increase their innovation budget) has dropped significantly as a 
result of the financial crisis (column 10). On the other hand, the number of firms which reduce 
or remain innovation investment unchanged or even have no innovation at all have increased 
dramatically as a result of the crisis (columns 11, 12 and 13, respectively). Compared to the 
results reported in Table 1, some countries (such as Romania, Lithuania, Greece…) are at the 
bottom of both tables indicating they are negatively impacted by the financial crisis mainly 
because the number of firms trying to increase innovation investment during the financial crisis 
has tremendously dropped. Meanwhile, the top spots of Table 1 and 2 do not seem to include 
the same countries. It implies that a country is less affected by the financial crisis not because 
they have more firms which are ready to ‘swim upstream’ to increase innovation spending 
during the crisis, but it is more because it has less firms having been forced to cut down on 
innovation activities. Overall, the evidence supplements to Archibugi and Filippetti’s (2010) 
findings suggesting a negative impact of the crisis on innovation activities in Europe. 
  
 
Essentially, the key problem to the real business world caused by the financial crisis is the 
difficulty in accessing the necessary finance. Therefore, as Paunov (2010) envisions, it is the 
difficulty in accessing the crucial finance for innovation that prevents the Schumpeterian 
‘creative destruction’ from happening. The evidence of the heavy impact of the financial crisis 
on EU innovation activities documented here also amplifies the long-standing warning that the 
EU is so ill-prepared for a large-scaled financial crisis due to the weaknesses of its policies 
(Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2010). 
[Table 2] 
4. The most and the least affected countries 
For the second research question, two groups of countries are identified: the most affected and 
the least affected (two countries in each group). Using data generated from section 3, the 
following criteria are used: (i) the most affected countries are those with 2009 innovation 
balance in the bottom 5 countries, excluding any countries with positive INBAL, and the 
balance has dropped the most since 2006; (ii) least affected countries are those with 2009 
innovation balance in the top 5 countries, excluding any countries with negative INBAL, and 
the balance has dropped the least since 2006.  
Column 14 of Table 1 shows that in terms of innovation balance, the top five countries are, in 
order, Sweden, Finland, Malta, Austria and Germany (Belgium also has the same INBAL with 
Germany at –3.8). Within the top five, we exclude Germany (and Belgium) because of their 
negative INBAL. Of the remained countries, column 16 of Table 1 shows that Austria and 
Finland have the smallest decrease in innovation balance. Hence, Austria and Finland are 
identified as the least affected countries in this paper. The bottom five countries are Ireland, 
Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Greece, in the presented order. In addition, column 16 of Table 
1 shows that within the bottom five countries, Lithuania and Greece have the largest drop of 
  
 
innovation balance compared to the reference period. Therefore, within this paper Lithuania 
and Greece are identified as the most affected countries.  
The above simple approach employed to classify the most and least affected countries does 
suffer from a flaw as it could not look into all components of the innovation balance. To 
compensate for any possible important omission resulted from such pitfall, however, CI_IN, 
CI_DE, CI_SA and CI_NO of the least and most affected countries are reviewed to see if they 
make sense with the simple approach employed. From Table 2, it could be seen that in terms 
of the number of firms which increase innovation budget, Lithuania has the largest drop (CI_IN 
is -45.6%) and Greece comes third (CI_IN is -40.9%). In addition, while CI_SA and CI_NO 
of Lithuania and Greece are not significantly larger than the other countries, their CI_DE, 
which measures the pressure of the crisis on firms having to reduce their innovation budget, 
tops the table in the first and second position, respectively. Hence, it seems to suggest that the 
simple classification of the most affected countries makes sense since it comprises the two 
countries which have the largest number of firms having to reduce innovation budget and the 
smallest number of firms that could increase the budget in the crisis. A similar review is then 
performed for Austria and Finland. It could be noted that CI_DE of Austria and Switzerland 
are remarkably smaller than the other countries while the other measures are about average. 
Again, it suggests that the applied classification is reasonable. 
5. What makes the impact of the financial crisis different across countries? 
The evidence presented thus far has been in line with the existing literature suggesting that the 
financial crisis does have a significant impact on innovation activities of European countries, 
and that the impact is unequal across different countries (e.g. Archibugi and Filippetti, 2010, 
2011; Archibugi et al., 2012, 2013 etc.). The main focus of this paper is placed on the possible 
explanations for the unequal impact of the financial crisis on innovation across European 
  
 
countries. This investigation is done by a comparative analysis in which several characteristics 
of the most and least affected countries will be compared and contrasted. The comparative 
analysis will cover four main dimensions of the NSI as outlined by Archibugi and Michie 
(1997), namely: national characteristics, higher education system, science and technology 
capabilities, structure of the economy. The design of this test is motivated by the existing 
literature which suggests that a stronger NSI would ameliorate the negative effect of financial 
crisis (e.g. Di Caprio et al., 2012).  
5.1. National characteristics 
To begin with, a range of information is looked at to give a first overall impression of the 
selected countries. In terms of geographical area, Finland is the largest country (338 thousand 
km2), followed by Greece (132), Austria (84) and Lithuania (65). However, according to the 
newest release of the United Nation, Greece has the largest population (11.2 million), followed 
by Austria (8.3) Finland (5.3) and Lithuania (3.3). In terms of the size of the economy, the 
European Union reports that in 2008 (i.e. the time when the financial crisis starts) GDP of 
Finland, Austria, Greece and Lithuania are 185,670, 282,744, 232,930 and 32,461 (€ million), 
respectively. Nevertheless, if one looks at the figures at the per inhabitant level, Finnish and 
Austrian people earns far better than the Greeks and Lithuanians. Another measure of 
modernity, life expectancy reflect a clear distinction between Finland, Austria and Greece 
compared to in Lithuania with longer-lived men (77, 78 and 78 compared to 67 years, 
respectively) and women (83, 84, 83 compared to 78, respectively). Although all four countries 
are now members of the EU, Lithuania has not joined the Eurozone yet (the country has entered 
the ERM II to prepare for the entry). All countries have their own official language, except 
Austria which uses German and Finland which uses both Finnish and Swedish. On average, 
however, Finnish pupils learn 2.2 more foreign languages, followed by Greece (2.0), Lithuania 
  
 
(1.8) and Austria (1.1). In terms of political system, the four countries are quite similar with 
the Republic model (although in Austria it is a Federal Republic). The major religion in all four 
countries is Christianity.   
Given that the paper is investigating about innovation, perhaps the most important difference 
between the two groups of country is culture. Hussler (2004), Kaasa and Vadi (2010), among 
others, have found that culture is a major factor that affects innovation capacity in the European 
context. There is a well-established literature comparing and contrasting the cultural 
differences between European countries (e.g. Hofstede, 1984; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985; 
Brodbeck et al, 2000). Ronen and Shenkar (1985) build upon Hofstede’s (1984) seminal study 
to cluster European cultures, of which Austria is in the Germanic cluster, Finland in the Nordic 
and Greece in the Near East while Lithuania is not classified. Various other studies, using 
different methodologies and looking at different cultural dimensions, have provided very 
consistent evidence that such clusters are reliable and sensible (e.g. Sirota and Greenwood, 
1971; Ronen and Kraut, 1977; Redding, 1976; Badawy, 1979 etc.). Using Hofstede’s classical 
cultural dimensions, the Near East countries, of which Greece is a typical member, in general 
have higher power distance and uncertainty avoidance while individualism is typically low and 
masculinity is about average. Lithuania, although is not a popular countries for cross-sectional 
studies about culture in European countries, has a very distinctive cultural characteristic 
compared to the other three selected countries since its modern history is heavily influenced by 
the USSR after the Second World War (Mockaitis, 2002). Despite being clustered into different 
groups, the Nordic and Germanic clusters share many similarities, for example in some studies 
they are grouped into a common cluster called Northern Europe (Griffeth et al., 1980; Haire et 
al., 1966). Hofstede (1984) also reports that Germanic and Nordic clusters have very similar 
indices for individualism, uncertainty avoidance and power distance; the only notable 
difference is across the masculinity dimension.  
  
 
Brodbeck et al. (2000) bases on Ronen and Shenkar’s (1985) to cluster European countries into 
culture-driven leadership prototypes, and reports that Austria and Finland are in the North West 
cluster while Greece is in the South East. Lithuania is again not classified. However, 
Lithuania’s nearest cultures, Poland and Russia, are both classified into the same cluster with 
Greece, the South East. On the leadership prototypicality scale introduced by Brodbeck et al. 
(2000), Greece scores remarkably higher than other countries along the ‘Team Integrator’ 
dimension. The North West countries generally rank higher in the ‘Participation’ scale which 
is in sharp contrast to the South East countries. Studies that examine the different between East 
versus West Europe, such as Trompenaars (1993), Smith et al. (1996), also puts a clear 
distinction between the two groups of countries considered: Austria and Finland are in the West 
while Greece and Lithuania are in the East cluster. Smith (1997) also classifies Austria and 
Finland into the North cluster while Greece is in the South (again Lithuania is not classified in 
this study). 
Overall, the existing literature suggests a remarkable within-group similarity as well as across-
group difference between the two groups investigated. For a convenient comparison, Table 3 
reports the scores for Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions of the four countries. Data for 
Greece, Finland and Austria is taken from Hofstede (2001), an updated publication of the 
scores based on subsequent replication studies, while for Lithuania, data is from Mockaitis 
(2002), a Lithuanian study that replicates Hofstede’s (1984) methodology. While masculinity 
indices are quite indistinguishable between the two groups of countries, the distinctions along 
the power distance, individualism and uncertainty avoidance are clear. Greece and Lithuania 
have remarkably higher scores for power distance and uncertainty avoidance, and lower scores 
for individualism compared to Austria and Finland. By design, power distance reflects how 
much a culture values authority and hierarchical relationships while individualism measures 
the tendency of a culture to value individual rights and uncertainty avoidance reflect the extent 
  
 
to which a culture would accept uncertainty. Taken together in the context of the impact of the 
financial crisis on innovation, an interesting insight emerges. In high power distance cultures, 
responsibilities are often concentrated around a few key personnel at the top while subordinates 
are more likely to simply ‘do as ordered’ rather than being creative. As in the case of Greece 
and Lithuania, high power distance is also companioned with low individualism and high 
uncertainty avoidance which tends to suggest that Greek and Lithuanian companies would try 
to avoid risky innovative investments when the business environment is not supportive. On the 
other hand, in low power distance and high individualism cultures as in Austria and Finland, 
individuals at all level in the companies are more willing to take on responsibilities and more 
proactive in their job to pursue personal goals. On top of that, low uncertainty avoidance would 
also suggest Austrian and Finnish companies are more willing to take on risky projects even 
when the environment is turbulent1. Therefore, it does not seem to be a coincidence that that 
Greece and Lithuania is among the most while Austria and Finland are among the least affected 
countries, but rather their cultures have actually played a role in either exaggerating (as in the 
case of Greece and Lithuania) or restraining (as for Austria and Finland) the negative impact 
of the financial crisis on innovation. 
[Table 3] 
5.2. Higher education system 
In time of crisis, what keeps a country moving ahead in terms of innovation is mainly its human 
resource. With more innovative people, the effect of the crisis would be expected to be less 
severe. Makkonen and Inkinen (2012) find that in the context of the EU, education is the main 
                                                          
1 On the uncertainty avoidance dimension, Lithuania also scores quite low (in fact it is 67, even lower than 
Austria at 70). We acknowledge that uncertainty avoidance scores do not seem capable to explain the 
reluctance in Lithuania in taking on risky innovative investments in times of crisis. With that exception 
acknowledged, we can still draw our main conclusions from this analysis mostly from the sharp contrast 
between the very high uncertainty avoidance score of Greece and the low scores of Austria and Finland. 
  
 
driver of innovation and economic development. Therefore, the quality of the higher education 
systems, from which the ‘innovative people’ mainly come, plays a crucial role in restraining 
or exaggerating the impact of the crisis. The paper, hence, compares and contrasts the higher 
education systems of the most and least affected countries.  
The analysis covers both the higher education providers (i.e. the universities) and the system’s 
products (i.e. the students and graduates), and both quality and quantity will be analyzed. To 
start with, the level of investment in education is considered since it would determine the 
quality of the system. Data for investment in education (denoted IE) is taken from Eurostat. 
The paper also analyzes quantitative data about students and graduates in science and 
technology fields. For such analysis, the paper looks at three further indicators, namely human 
resources in science and technology (denoted HRST), doctoral students in science and 
technology (denoted DSST) and doctoral graduates in science and technology (denoted 
DGST). Data for the first two measures are from the Eurostat and the last one is derived from 
the European Commission’s (2009b) European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS hereafter). EIS has 
been published annually since 2001 by Pro Inno Europe, a European Commission’s initiative 
to foster cooperation of national innovation across the EU. The EIS uses data from various 
sources, including the national innovation surveys conducted in each countries and statistics 
available from the Eurostat as well as others such as the IMF or World Bank. The EIS measures 
the general strength of a country’s innovation ability by a composite measure, namely SII, 
which aggregates a range of indicators reflecting seven dimensions of innovation, namely 
human resources, finance and support, firm investments, linkages and entrepreneurship, 
throughputs, innovators and economic effects. To represent the status of the higher education 
systems at the time when the crisis starts, data for 2008 is used (except for the EIS where data 
of the 2009 publication is used since data used for the EIS is lagged one year). If data for the 
year 2008 of a country is missing, the last available data for that country is used.  
  
 
Table 4 below reports data on the level of investment in education and the quantity of science 
and technology personnel produced by the higher education systems of the selected countries. 
In terms of investment in education, as shown in Table 4, Greece and Lithuania invested 
significantly less compared to Austria and Finland (4.09% and 4.87% compared to 5.47% and 
6.1%, respectively). Besides, the least affected ones generally have higher HRST, DSST and 
DGST, respectively. Although HRST and DSST of Austria are not significantly higher than 
Greece and Lithuania, there is a sharp contrast between Finland and the most affected countries. 
In terms of DGST, the least affected countries are far better than the most affected. 
[Table 4] 
Malva and Carree (2013) show that it is the quality of academic research, rather than the mere 
presence of researchers, that affects innovation capacity. To take quality into account as a 
supplement to the evidence presented earlier, the Times Higher Education’s (2012) universities 
ranking, one of the most popular universities league tables in the world, is analyzed to access 
the quality of the top universities in the most and the least affected countries. Of course there 
are various other university rankings beside the Times Higher Education. However, there is 
existing evidence suggesting top university rankings converge in terms of the methodology 
employed (e.g. Turner, 2005), thus the resulting rankings are highly correlated (e.g. Dill and 
Soo, 2005). Therefore, this paper restricts to the use of only the Times Higher Education’s 
(2012) ranking. In particular, the list of top 400 universities ranked by the Times Higher 
Education (2012) is screened for universities in the most and least affected countries. Finland 
has five universities in the top 400 universities ranked by the Times Higher Education (2012), 
namely University of Helsinki (91), Aalto University (301-350), University of Eastern Finland 
(301-350), University of Tampere (301-350) and University of Turku (351-400). Austria has 
three: University of Vienna (139), University of Innsbruck (201-225), Karl-Franzens-
  
 
Universität Graz (251-275). Greece has only University of Crete (276-300) in the list while 
Lithuania does not have any. Therefore, based on the Times Higher Education’s ranking, there 
is preliminary evidence that the least affected countries generally have a better higher education 
system.  
Overall, the evidence seems to imply that the least affected countries does have a better higher 
education system, both in terms of the providers and the products of the system. In time of 
crisis, such better quality higher education system could restrain the impact of the crisis on 
innovation. 
5.3. Science and technological capabilities 
Archibugi and Michie (1997) show that different countries do have different science and 
technological capabilities (STC hereafter), which in turn would determine how persistent 
innovation activities are when external shocks are introduced. Applying such intuition, 
therefore, the paper compares and contrasts the STC of the least and the most affected 
countries. The analysis covers ten indicators of the STC as follows: (i) High-tech and 
knowledge-intensive (hi-tech hereafter) trade, (ii) Hi-tech trade as a percentage of the world’s 
volume, (iii) number of employees working in hi-tech industries, (iv) number of hi-tech firms, 
(v) number of hi-tech patent applications, (vi) total number of patent application, (vii) R&D 
personnel and researchers as a percentage of total labour force, (viii) total R&D expenditure, 
(ix) total government’s R&D and (x) intangible fixed assets. The first and second dimensions 
would capture how intensive a country is in terms of acquiring economic returns from 
innovative activities, both on its own and relatively to other countries. Items (iii) and (iv) 
provide a reference as to how ‘big’ the hi-tech industries are in each country. The (v) and (vi) 
items would tell us how effective innovative activities in each country are in terms of 
generating the results. Items (vii) and (viii) provide data about the size of R&D activities, to 
  
 
which item (ix) supplements since the governments could invest in R&D activities that benefit 
the economy as a whole (rather than just benefiting the firm as with business R&D). Finally, 
the last item is intangible fixed asset capturing the size of intellectual capital, an important 
output of innovative activity. Data for all of the above ten indicators is collected from Eurostat 
and the definitions of the indicators are also the same as stated by Eurostat. 
Table 5 presents the above-defined ten indicators of the STC. As shown in column 2 and 3, 
Austria and Finland have quite a sizable share in the world market for hi-tech products which 
is much larger than that of Greece and Lithuania. Although Greece has the largest number of 
people employed in hi-tech industries, which is partly due to the country’s larger population, 
Austria and Finland have by far more hi-tech firms than Greece and Lithuania (42,950 and 
46,143 compared to 12,443 and 1958, respectively). The number of registered hi-tech patents 
and total number of patents in Austria and Finland are significantly higher compared to Greece 
and Lithuania, ranging from 15 to 100 times larger. The percentage of people working in R&D 
fields in Austria and Finland is also two to three times higher than in Greece and Lithuania 
(1.36% and 2.1% compared to 0.72% and 0.78%). In terms of R&D spending, Austria and 
Finland also exhibit a much larger numbers both in terms of total R&D spending in general 
and government R&D investment in particular. Finally, in Austria and Finland the value of 
intangible fixed assets, most of which would reflect the value of innovation projects such as 
registered patents, trademarks etc. is also higher than in Greece and Lithuania. In a nutshell, 
the least affected countries remarkably and consistently outperform the most affected countries 
across the ten dimensions of science and technological capabilities covered. Hence, the 
evidence implies that the stronger science and technological capabilities in Austria and Finland 




5.4. Structure of the economy: Industrial structure and firm’s size 
Innovative activities are more important for some industries (such as industrial and some 
knowledge-intensive services etc.) and less important for others (such as agriculture etc.). 
Therefore, if a country is tilted towards certain sectors which are less dependent on innovations 
to thrive, it is expected that the crisis would have little effects and vice versa. The paper 
provides a breakdown of EU countries’ gross value added (GVA hereafter) into five main 
sectors, (the rest is grouped to ‘Others’ classification), namely (i) agriculture, hunting and 
fishing, (ii) construction, (iii) business activities and financial services, (iv) industry (including 
energy), and (v) trade, transport and communication services. Such classification is used by 
Eurostat from which data for this analysis is collected. Table 6 presents and illustrates the 
shares of different sectors in the gross value added of the selected countries. Although not very 
clear, a contrast could be observed between the two groups of countries. As compared to Greece 
and Lithuania, Austria and Finland depends less on trade and transportation to create value 
added while the relative contributions of industry and financial services are heavier2. 
[Table 6] 
In addition, firm’s size does matter in defending innovative activities against economic 
downturns. Archibugi and Michie (1997) argue that most basic innovations, which are typically 
long-term, highly costly and associated with high uncertainties, are often conducted by large 
firms. On the other hand, there is also a lot of evidence suggesting that small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs hereafter) are more likely to be successful in innovation (e.g. Porter, 1980; 
                                                          
2 Greece and Lithuania also seem to rely more on Agriculture, hunting and fishing compared to Austria and 
Finland. It might suggest Greece and Lithuania could be less affected by the financial crisis because the 
agriculture, hunting and fishing sector is less dependent on innovation. However, it is noted that the 
differences in the weight of the agriculture, hunting and fishing sector in the overall GVA in the interested 




Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Nooteboom, 1994; Vossen, 1998). However, SMEs also 
typically face with financial constraints, which could be a major problem during a financial 
crisis episode. In fact, the literature has shown that the 2007-2009 financial crisis has made it 
extremely difficult for small firms to finance their operations (Cosh et al., 2009; Lamoreaux 
and Levenstein, 2011). Therefore, it is hypothesized that the more a role SMEs play in a 
country’ economy, the more severe the effect of the financial crisis on innovation would be. 
Data for this analysis comes from the publicly available database attached to the European 
Commission (2009c). For each selected country, the paper will collect data and breakdown the 
number of firms, number of employees and turnovers by firm’s size. Following the European 
Commission’s (2009c) classification, micro firms are defined as those with less than 10 
employees, small firms are those with 10-49, medium-sized firms with 50-249 and large firms 
with more than 250 employees. Table 7 reports the breakdown of the number of firms, number 
of employees and total revenues by firm size. In comparison between the most and least 
affected countries, a trend is revealed. In terms of the number of SMEs, SMEs dominates in all 
four countries (more than 99% in all cases). However, there are distinction in terms of 
employees and turnover generated. Although occupied less than 1% of the total number of 
firms, large firms in Austria and Finland employ more people (33% and 40% of the total 
workforce, respectively) as compared to in Greece and Lithuania (13% and 25%, respectively). 
Besides, large firms in Austria and Finland also generate more turnovers (36% and 52% of 
total turnover, respectively) while the corresponding numbers in Greece and Lithuania are just 
22% and 34%. Higher revenues generated by larger companies generally indicate a country 
would resist the impact of the financial crisis better thanks to the stronger financial status of 
those large companies. Thus, it could be concluded that SMEs play a more important role in 






The global financial crisis which swept through the whole world financial system during the 
2007-2009 period has many severe consequences. One of the problems that would cause a 
long-term negative impact is if the crisis has actually reduced innovation activities. This creates 
a great demand for research that could provide evidence about the impact of the financial crisis 
on innovation activities. 
This paper investigates how the financial crisis has affected innovation activities in Europe as 
well as what factors of the NSI exaggerate and mitigate the impacts of the financial crisis across 
countries. The paper examines the similarities of the NSI factors of the countries of which 
innovation activities are most affected by the financial crisis, and compare them with the 
common NSI characteristics shared by the countries which are affected by the financial crisis 
the least. It is found that the financial crisis has negatively affected innovation activities in 
Europe. Moreover, the paper provides important evidence that Greece and Lithuania, the most 
affected countries, are quite different from Austria and Finland, the least affected ones, along 
four important dimensions of the NSI, namely culture, higher education systems, science and 
technological capabilities, and structure of the economy.  Those sharp contrasts would to a 
large extent explain why the financial crisis affected different EU member states differently. 
The insight brought forward by this paper is topically important for EU leaders in drafting 
policy in the post-crisis era to enhance convergence within the region. 
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TABLE 1: INNOVATION BALANCE BEFORE AND DURING THE CRISIS 
Country 
In the last six months has your company taken one of the 
following actions [increased, decreased or maintained the 
innovation spending] as a direct result of the economic 
downturn?   
Compared to 2006, has the amount spent by your firm on 
all innovation activities in 2008 increased, decreased, or 







N Increase Decrease Same No Innovation NA   N Increase Decrease Same No Innovation NA Drop 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   8 9 10 11 12 13 14 = 3 – 4 15 = 9 – 10  16 = 14 – 15 
Sweden 200 14.1 12 69.1 4.5 0.3  200 50.5 5.4 37.2 4.4 2.4 2.1 45.1 -43 
Finland 203 15.8 14 64.9 5.3 0  203 41.2 6.2 49.2 3.5 0 1.8 35 -33.2 
Malta 72 16.1 14.6 51.2 17.6 0.4  72 46.4 3.9 33.2 12.7 3.7 1.5 42.5 -41 
Austria 201 10.6 10.1 73.9 3.5 1.9  201 38.8 5.5 50.8 1.7 3.1 0.5 33.3 -32.8 
Germany  200 9.4 13.2 68.8 8 0.6  200 42 5.1 50.1 1.7 1.1 -3.8 36.9 -40.7 
Belgium 200 8.1 11.9 47.7 27.2 5.2  200 24.8 5.8 31.2 25.2 13 -3.8 19 -22.8 
Netherlands 200 9.3 15 65 9.8 1  200 32.6 8 51.1 5.6 2.7 -5.7 24.6 -30.3 
Denmark 200 15.3 22.1 51.4 8.9 2.2  200 33.2 9.8 51.2 3.7 2 -6.8 23.4 -30.2 
Luxembourg 71 7.8 15.3 67.6 7.1 2.2  71 29.6 6.2 58 1.9 4.3 -7.5 23.4 -30.9 
Bulgaria 200 7.7 16.6 40.2 27.4 8  200 34 6.5 24.1 22.7 12.7 -8.9 27.5 -36.4 
Slovakia 202 15.1 28.1 48.2 4 4.6  202 46.5 9.5 39.7 1.4 2.8 -13 37 -50 
United Kingdom 201 7.7 21.1 62.2 5.9 3.1  201 29.8 8.7 52 4 5.6 -13.4 21.1 -34.5 
Slovenia 200 4.6 18.5 66.6 9.3 0.9  200 36.8 8.5 47.8 5.2 1.7 -13.9 28.3 -42.2 
Portugal 203 12.7 26.8 55.5 5 0  203 34.8 13.1 45.6 6.5 0 -14.1 21.7 -35.8 
Czech Republic 204 12.8 27.4 52.3 4.8 2.7  204 37.5 12.2 43.3 3.8 3.3 -14.6 25.3 -39.9 
Italy 200 8.1 23.9 59.5 1.8 6.8  200 33.9 12.7 48.1 1.5 3.7 -15.8 21.2 -37 
Spain 200 9.6 25.7 59.3 5 0.4  200 27.4 10.6 57 4 0.9 -16.1 16.8 -32.9 
Estonia 200 6.7 25.2 53.1 10.8 4.2  200 28.3 13.2 46.9 3.8 7.8 -18.5 15.1 -33.6 
Hungary 202 3.1 21.8 42.8 31.7 0.7  202 23.9 14.1 28.3 29 4.8 -18.7 9.8 -28.5 
France 202 6.3 26.6 56.6 10.1 0.3  202 30.9 6.1 50.5 8.3 4.1 -20.3 24.8 -45.1 
Poland 201 6.8 28.2 48.4 10.5 6  201 38.9 11.2 34.2 7.4 8.3 -21.4 27.7 -49.1 
  
 
Cyprus 70 6.2 27.7 57.9 8.3 0  70 37.1 2.6 52.5 7.4 0.4 -21.5 34.5 -56 
Ireland 201 9.7 31.3 56.6 1.8 0.5  201 29.6 14.3 52.2 2.5 1.3 -21.6 15.3 -36.9 
Romania 201 9.2 33.4 43.4 12.2 1.8  201 49.5 8.1 30.2 9.1 3.1 -24.2 41.4 -65.6 
Latvia 200 7.6 41.9 32.7 17.8 0  200 23.6 18.4 44.6 10.1 3.4 -34.3 5.2 -39.5 
Lithuania 200 5.4 41.9 38.1 10 4.7  200 45.6 9.1 28.4 5.8 11 -36.5 36.5 -73 
Greece 200 1.8 44 43.4 10 0.7   200 42.4 13.9 36.3 6.6 0.8 -42.2 28.5 -70.7 




TABLE 2: CHANGES IN THE PERCENTAGES OF FIRMS INCREASE, DECREASE, MAINTAIN THE SAME INNOVATION SPENDING 
OR HAVE NO INNOVATION BEFORE AND DURING THE CRISIS 
Countries 
In the last six months has your company taken one 
of the following actions [increased, decreased or 
maintained the innovation spending] as a direct 
result of the economic downturn? (% excluding 
N/A answers)   
Compared to 2006, has the amount spent by 
your firm on all innovation activities in 2008 
increased, decreased, or stayed 
approximately the same (% excluding N/A 
answers)   
Change 
Increase Decrease Same No Innovation   Increase Decrease Same No Innovation   CI_IN CI_DE CI_SA CI_NO 
1 2 3 4 5   6 7 8 9   10 = 2 - 6 11 = 3 - 7 12 = 4 - 8 13 = 5 - 9 
Latvia 7.6 41.9 32.7 17.8  24.4 19 46.1 10.4  -16.8 22.9 -13.4 7.4 
Spain 9.6 25.8 59.5 5  27.7 10.7 57.6 4  -18 15.1 2 1 
Denmark 15.7 22.6 52.6 9.1  33.9 10 52.3 3.8  -18.3 12.6 0.3 5.3 
Belgium 8.5 12.5 50.3 28.7  28.5 6.7 35.9 29  -20 5.9 14.4 -0.3 
Ireland 9.8 31.5 56.9 1.8  30 14.5 52.9 2.5  -20.3 17 4 -0.7 
Hungary 3.1 21.9 43.1 31.9  25.1 14.8 29.7 30.4  -22 7.1 13.4 1.5 
Portugal 12.7 26.8 55.5 5  34.8 13.1 45.6 6.5  -22.1 13.7 9.9 -1.5 
Luxembourg 8 15.6 69.1 7.3  30.9 6.5 60.6 2  -23 9.2 8.5 5.3 
United Kingdom 7.9 21.8 64.2 6.1  31.5 9.2 55 4.2  -23.6 12.6 9.2 1.9 
Estonia 7 26.3 55.4 11.3  30.7 14.3 50.9 4.1  -23.7 12 4.6 7.2 
Netherlands 9.4 15.1 65.6 9.9  33.5 8.2 52.5 5.8  -24.1 6.9 13.1 4.1 
Finland 15.8 14 64.9 5.3  41.2 6.2 49.2 3.5  -25.4 7.8 15.7 1.8 
Czech Republic 13.2 28.2 53.8 4.9  38.7 12.6 44.7 3.9  -25.6 15.6 9 1 
France 6.3 26.7 56.8 10.1  32.3 6.4 52.7 8.7  -25.9 20.3 4.1 1.5 
Italy 8.7 25.6 63.8 1.9  35.2 13.2 50 1.6  -26.6 12.4 13.8 0.4 
Austria 10.8 10.3 75.3 3.6  40.1 5.7 52.5 1.8  -29.3 4.6 22.9 1.8 
Bulgaria 8.4 18.1 43.7 29.8  38.9 7.4 27.6 26  -30.6 10.6 16.1 3.8 
Cyprus 6.2 27.7 57.8 8.3  37.2 2.6 52.7 7.4  -31.1 25.1 5.1 0.9 
Malta 16.2 14.7 51.5 17.7  48.2 4.1 34.5 13.2  -32.1 10.6 16.9 4.5 
Slovakia 15.8 29.5 50.5 4.2  47.9 9.8 40.9 1.4  -32.1 19.7 9.6 2.8 
  
 
Slovenia 4.6 18.7 67.3 9.4  37.4 8.6 48.6 5.3  -32.8 10 18.6 4.1 
Germany  9.5 13.3 69.2 8  42.5 5.2 50.7 1.7  -33 8.1 18.6 6.3 
Poland 7.2 30 51.5 11.2  42.4 12.2 37.3 8.1  -35.2 17.8 14.2 3.1 
Sweden 14.1 12 69.3 4.5  51.8 5.5 38.2 4.5  -37.7 6.5 31.2 0 
Greece 1.8 44.4 43.8 10.1  42.7 14 36.6 6.7  -40.9 30.3 7.2 3.4 
Romania 9.4 34 44.2 12.4  51.1 8.4 31.2 9.4  -41.7 25.7 13 3 
Lithuania 5.7 43.9 39.9 10.5   51.3 10.2 31.9 6.5   -45.6 33.7 8 4 
Notes: Columns 1 to 9 convert the raw data from the Innobarometer 2009 into percentages excluding the N/A answers from the total responses. CI_IN (CI_DE, CI_SA, CI_NO) is the difference 
between column 2 and 6 (3 and 7, 4 and 8, 5 and 9 respectively). 
  
 








Greece 60 35 112 57 
Lithuania 45 50 67 65 
Austria 11 55 70 79 
Finland 33 63 59 26 
Notes: Power distance reflects the extent to which less powerful people accept and expect 
power to be distributed equally. Individualism reflects the extent to which people take more 
care of themselves and their own family. Uncertainty avoidance reflects the extent to which 
people feel uncomfortable with uncertainty. Masculinity reflects the extent to which people 
prefer achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material reward for success rather than 
cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life. Definitions of variables are 
reproduced with some minor adjustments from Hofstede (1984). 
TABLE 4: HUMAN RESOURCES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
  IE HRST DSST DGST 
Greece 4.09 31.7 0.52 0.5 
Lithuania 4.87 42.5 0.23 0.68 
Austria 5.47 37.8 0.53 1.64 
Finland 6.10 50.1 1.36 2.3 
Notes: IE is the investment in education as a percentage of GDP. HRST is the 
percentage of the total labour force in the age group 25-64, that is classified as having 
either successfully completed an education at the third level in a science and 
technology field of study or is employed in an occupation where such an education is 
normally required (HRST are measured mainly using the concepts and definitions 
laid down in the Canberra Manual, OECD, Paris, 1995). DSST is doctoral students in 
science and technology fields of study, as a percentage of the population 20-29 year 
old. DGST is doctoral graduates in science and technology fields of study, as a 
percentage of the population 25-34 year old. Definitions of variables are reproduced 
from Eurostat and the European Commission (2009b). 
  
 
TABLE 5: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES 
  HTTP (%)  HTTV (€mil) HTE HTF HTP TP RDP (%) TRD (€mil) GRD  IFA (€mil) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Belgium 1.394 13750 4437 NA 301 1450 1.22 6812.699 1.36 NA 
Bulgaria 0.10 1,199 3,353 5,957 4 18 0.48 167 0.80 144 
Czech Republic 0.95 9,322 4,995 33,071 23 207 0.97 2,169 1.29 2,217 
Denmark 0.49 5,444 2,853 11,940 225 1,251 1.99 6,701 1.64 5,184 
Germany 6.95 56,103 38,481 89,537 3,078 22,655 1.25 66,532 1.81 27,540 
Estonia 0.06 685 657 1,967 16 34 0.73 208 1.62 95 
Ireland 0.86 5,811 2,100 NA 90 321 0.91 2,616 1.25 1,393 
Greece 0.33 3,896 4,549 12,443 13 90 0.72 1,342 0.59 2,204 
Spain 1.85 18,659 20,243 45,155 246 1,408 0.94 14,701 1.87 14,462 
France 3.99 39,309 25,900 NA 1,914 8,578 1.36 41,066 1.65 41,452 
Italy 2.04 20,291 23,353 111,803 437 4,648 NA 18,993 1.30 16,706 
Cyprus 0.03 350 380 507 1 11 0.30 73 1.00 18 
Latvia 0.05 607 1,125 2,397 3 23 0.54 142 0.75 199 
Lithuania 0.07 803 1,518 1,958 4 16 0.78 258 0.70 391 
Luxembourg 0.39 1,212 202 1,465 5 92 2.18 619 1.21 751 
Hungary 0.82 6,061 3,879 35,818 44 178 0.65 1,059 0.87 1,142 
Malta 0.06 527 160 29,653 2 6 0.55 33 0.35 112 
Netherlands 4.20 17,062 8,513 16,010 781 3,361 1.05 10,502 1.71 11,650 
Austria 0.86 8,830 4,076 42,950 177 1,589 1.36 7,548 1.42 4,709 
Poland 0.91 10,155 15,758 17,389 30 229 0.44 2,194 0.70 2,772 
Portugal 0.42 5,462 5,100 17,508 27 112 0.84 2,585 1.92 2,299 
Romania 0.32 3,557 9,369 5,265 15 33 0.31 809 1.01 1,496 
Slovenia 0.12 1,357 991 2,916 15 140 1.11 617 1.15 490 
Slovakia 0.32 3,741 2,433 8,455 8 34 0.58 305 0.79 845 
Finland 0.55 4,325 2,531 46,143 422 1,233 2.10 6,871 1.98 2,731 
Sweden 0.94 9,597 4,593 151,485 722 2,696 1.62 12,314 1.55 10,308 
United Kingdom 3.76 28,088 29,295 13,736 1,080 5,119 1.10 32,200 1.37 21,157 
Notes: HTTP is the trade of hi-tech products and services as a percentage of the world's volume. HTTV is the volume of trade of hi-tech products and services. HTE is the number of 
employees working in hi-tech industries. HTF is the number of firms in hi-tech industries. HTP is the number of registered hi-tech patents. TP is the total number of registered patents. 
RDP is the personnel working in R&D fields as a percentage of the total population. TRD is the total R&D spending. GRD is the total R&D spending of the government. IFA is the 
value of intangible fixed assets. 
  
 














Belgium 0.7 5.5 29.4 17.6 22.6 23.8 
Bulgaria 6.9 8.4 23.4 22 24.4 14.9 
Czech Republic 2.4 6.3 17.1 29.6 24.1 16 
Denmark 1 5.4 24.9 20.1 21.1 26.6 
Germany 0.9 4.1 29.6 25.7 17.9 22.2 
Estonia 2.7 8.6 24.4 20.2 24.8 17.9 
Ireland 1.3 7.7 29 23.8 17.5 20.7 
Greece 3.2 5.2 19.5 13.4 35.3 25.8 
Spain 2.7 11.4 22.8 17 24.4 21.6 
France 2.1 6.7 33.7 13.7 19 25.7 
Italy 2 6.1 27.6 20.7 22.1 20.9 
Cyprus 2.3 9.2 28.3 9.5 27.6 24.1 
Latvia 3.1 9.1 23.6 14.1 29.6 21.1 
Lithuania 3.7 9.9 16.6 21.5 30.4 17.3 
Luxembourg 0.3 5.4 49.2 8.8 20.9 15.3 
Hungary 4.3 4.4 23 25.1 21.4 22.5 
Malta 1.9 4.3 20.5 17.4 26.8 30.6 
Netherlands 1.8 5.8 27.9 19.8 21.2 23.7 
Austria 1.7 7.1 23.8 23.2 23.7 20.6 
Poland 3.7 7.3 19.5 24.3 26.2 19.1 
Portugal 2.4 6.7 23.6 17.3 25.6 24.4 
Romania 7.4 11.9 15 25.8 25 14.8 
Slovenia 2.5 8.3 22.3 25.5 22.6 18.9 
Slovakia 4.2 9.7 17.7 29 24.7 15 
Finland 2.9 7.2 22.9 24.8 19.6 22 
Sweden 1.8 5.2 25.2 21.6 19.6 26.7 
United Kingdom 0.8 6.5 32.8 16.2 21.1 23 
  
 
TABLE 7: BREAKDOWN OF THE NUMBER OF FIRMS, NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
AND TURNOVER BY FIRM SIZE 
 Micro Small Medium-sized SMEs Large Total 
1 2 3 4 5 = 2 + 3 + 4 6 7 
Panel A: Number of firms           
Austria 261,259 31,389 4,848 297,496 1,017 298,513 
Belgium 383,336 27,816 4,016 415,168 823 415,991 
Bulgaria 255,697 24,890 4,897 285,484 780 286,264 
Cyprus 42,207 3,149 456 45,812 65 45,877 
Czech Republic 856,261 35,285 7,212 898,758 1,513 900,271 
Denmark 185,893 23,479 4,008 213,380 717 214,097 
Estonia 37,123 6,205 1,188 44,516 162 44,678 
Finland 199,189 12,447 2,362 213,998 602 214,600 
France 2,208,562 155,000 23,534 2,387,096 5,050 2,392,146 
Germany 1,520,873 257,525 42,777 1,821,175 8,840 1,830,015 
Greece 820,021 25,789 3,579 849,389 431 849,820 
Hungary 503,171 25,122 4,125 532,418 822 533,240 
Ireland 79,924 13,573 2,611 96,108 463 96,571 
Italy 3,731,348 189,294 20,151 3,940,793 3,096 3,943,889 
Latvia 59,929 10,086 1,877 71,892 240 72,132 
Lithuania 113,840 12,021 2,613 128,474 347 128,821 
Luxembourg 21,305 2,636 518 24,459 103 24,562 
Malta 32,671 1,208 209 34,088 39 34,127 
Netherlands 484,160 44,616 7,569 536,345 1,353 537,698 
Poland 1,502,959 44,500 15,185 1,562,644 3,105 1,565,749 
Portugal 818,685 40,491 5,665 864,841 803 865,644 
Romania 389,389 41,500 9,174 440,063 1,802 441,865 
Slovakia 42,230 10,577 2,178 54,985 527 55,512 
Slovenia 94,696 5,773 1,285 101,754 272 102,026 
Spain 2,487,681 184,117 22,048 2,693,846 3,268 2,697,114 
Sweden 523,126 26,486 4,661 554,273 968 555,241 
United Kingdom 1,420,417 170,372 27,348 1,618,137 5,970 1,624,107 
Panel B: Number of employees      
Austria 648,079 594,568 483,839 1,726,486 840,483 2,566,969 
Belgium 754,437 544,498 393,946 1,692,881 837,854 2,530,735 
Bulgaria 588,637 489,398 484,957 1,562,992 547,681 2,110,673 
Cyprus 91,021 58,104 45,784 194,909 38,467 233,376 
Czech Republic 1,077,519 693,604 733,587 2,504,710 1,199,348 3,704,058 
Denmark 363,124 464,537 387,106 1,214,767 626,593 1,841,360 
Estonia 106,002 122,606 112,607 341,215 92,719 433,934 
Finland 304,292 247,752 237,646 789,690 533,213 1,322,903 
France 3,714,919 3,130,988 2,435,146 9,281,053 5,757,419 15,038,472 
Germany 4,288,700 4,843,235 4,288,582 13,420,517 8,762,628 22,183,145 
Greece 1,538,632 459,784 312,489 2,310,905 343,810 2,654,715 
Hungary 881,142 479,676 406,302 1,767,120 719,477 2,486,597 
Ireland 233,851 275,076 256,864 765,791 351,925 1,117,716 
Italy 7,292,281 3,351,855 1,935,295 12,579,431 2,961,028 15,540,459 
Latvia 150,488 196,453 182,560 529,501 164,144 693,645 
Lithuania 217,485 241,469 252,582 711,536 242,271 953,807 
Luxembourg 42,129 52,758 52,065 146,952 73,163 220,115 
Malta 46,429 20,965 21,105 88,499 26,731 115,230 
Netherlands 1,537,007 1,139,399 884,055 3,560,461 1,739,284 5,299,745 
Poland 3,295,674 988,919 1,595,013 5,879,606 2,654,220 8,533,826 
Portugal 1,395,210 764,746 541,876 2,701,832 615,420 3,317,252 
Romania 876,357 821,061 935,751 2,633,169 1,509,794 4,142,963 
Slovakia 150,746 179,482 234,273 564,501 453,723 1,018,224 
Slovenia 178,670 111,371 133,755 423,796 208,665 632,461 
Spain 5,377,223 3,636,271 2,109,383 11,122,877 3,130,652 14,253,529 
Sweden 685,631 578,795 501,667 1,766,093 1,005,178 2,771,271 
United Kingdom 3,817,765 3,183,757 2,723,685 9,725,207 8,012,260 17,737,467 
  
 
 Micro Small Medium-sized SMEs Large Total 
1 2 3 4 5 = 2 + 3 + 4 6 7 
Panel C: Turnover (€ million)      
Austria 101,626 127,783 125,263 354,672 202,264 556,936 
Belgium 183,955 176,750 163,996 524,700 337,684 862,384 
Bulgaria 20,228 23,768 21,699 65,695 35,271 100,966 
Cyprus 7,867 7,583 6,467 21,917 4,314 26,231 
Czech Republic 73,303 74,132 98,005 245,439 171,960 417,400 
Denmark 108,784 101,596 101,616 311,996 153,575 465,571 
Estonia 10,587 12,384 12,147 35,118 7,891 43,009 
Finland 59,543 55,541 68,540 183,624 197,770 381,394 
France 665,549 668,162 592,676 1,926,387 1,536,957 3,463,344 
Germany 539,373 756,698 913,395 2,209,466 2,430,931 4,640,396 
Greece 115,684 75,692 63,891 255,267 74,070 329,337 
Hungary 59,398 49,690 54,073 163,162 114,233 277,395 
Ireland 46,292 61,684 84,674 192,650 153,590 346,240 
Italy 829,841 664,431 586,291 2,080,563 850,424 2,930,987 
Latvia 12,253 15,159 15,189 42,601 10,877 53,479 
Lithuania 8,670 15,543 17,660 41,874 21,861 63,735 
Luxembourg 14,989 19,675 14,163 48,827 33,467 82,294 
Malta 3,344 2,124 1,577 7,044 2,888 9,932 
Netherlands 184,016 246,327 309,967 740,309 444,441 1,184,750 
Poland 162,233 96,787 161,648 420,667 290,403 711,071 
Portugal 90,175 77,816 74,208 242,199 101,641 343,840 
Romania 78,390 98,419 90,714 267,523 188,237 455,760 
Slovakia 16,541 20,726 27,388 64,654 65,947 130,601 
Slovenia 16,444 15,503 19,429 51,376 29,861 81,237 
Spain 533,687 544,144 458,704 1,536,534 752,537 2,289,071 
Sweden 124,485 124,496 130,976 379,957 299,650 679,607 
United Kingdom 554,378 608,141 707,513 1,870,033 1,977,730 3,847,762 
 
 
 
 
 
